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Making an Administrative Trustee Agent
Accountable: Reason-Based Decision Making
within the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism
Thomas Gehring and Isabel Plocher
Otto-Friedrich-University Bamberg
Decisions within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the
Kyoto Protocol are made by an expert body that acts as a trustee agent
of the member states. Trustee agents help overcome the credible com-
mitment problems of their principals and promise reason-based deci-
sions. In contrast to traditional principal-agent settings, trusteeship
relations are typically triadic. Beside the preferences of the principals
and the trustee, decision criteria provide an external point of reference.
They reflect the principals’ long-term interest and define the trustee’s
decision rationale. The triadic structure helps protect the autonomy of
trustees and allows for making them accountable for their decisions.
Accountability mechanisms intend to ensure that a trustee’s decisions
are in line with established decision criteria. Against this backdrop, we
explore the incentives created by the existing institutional arrangement
for the making of CDM decisions and examine selected cases. We
conclude that CDM arrangements provide a model for nonpartisan
international regulation.
Delegation of decision-making authority to international institutions raises the
problem of accountability of the power-wielding agents (Grant and Keohane
2005; Scott 2000). It occurs whenever the member states of an international insti-
tution establish a secretariat, a scientific committee, or any other entity entrusted
with particular functions. Standard principal-agent theory conceives of delegation
as a contractual arrangement in which the principal grants authority to an agent
to act on behalf of himself, whereby the grant is revocable and limited in time
or scope (Hawkins et al. 2006, 7). Accountability arrangements are intended to
limit the power-wielding agents’ ability to acquire an undesirably extensive
degree of autonomy (Nielson and Tierney 2003) and to avoid cooperation
pathologies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
This article examines how administrative trustee agents can be made account-
able for their decisions without jeopardizing their proper functioning. The
design of arrangements for holding trustees accountable is particularly demand-
ing. Trustees are established in response to their principals’ self-perceived ten-
dency to behave opportunistically in specific decision situations. Independent
regulatory agencies (Thatcher 2002) and central banks (Gilardi 2007) as well as
domestic and international courts (Alter 2008) illustrate that political actors
may gain an interest in committing themselves credibly not to intervene into
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day-to-day decision making (Moravcsik 1998, 472). In these cases, recommenda-
tions of standard principal-agent theory for comparatively close oversight of
agents are not applicable, because trustees ought to act differently from what
their principals would have done in their place (Majone 2001a). Close oversight
by the principals and the permanent re-contraction threat suggested by standard
principal-agent theory (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Kiewiet and McCubbins
1991) would inevitably undermine a trustee’s ability to fulfill her regulatory func-
tions. Instead, accountability arrangements must be designed so as to ensure
problem-adequate decision making without undermining the relationship
between themember states of an international institution and their trustee agent.
The approval of climate-friendly projects under the Clean Development Mech-
anism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change raises the accountability problems involved in
delegation of administrative decisions to trustees. Approval decisions have been
almost entirely assigned to an executive board that enjoys comparatively far-
reaching autonomy and operates like an independent regulatory agency similar
to what is known in domestic political systems (Thatcher 2002) and the Euro-
pean Union (Gehring and Krapohl 2007). Under the Protocol, most industrial-
ized countries have accepted to reduce their emissions of certain greenhouse
gases by a fixed percentage (see generally Oberthu¨r and Ott 1999). The CDM
allows them to implement their obligations partly through projects reducing
emissions in developing countries (Netto and Barani Schmidt 2005). As emission
reductions generated by CDM projects increase the amount of tradable emission
permits, the CDM threatens to undermine the control system of the Kyoto
Protocol (Yamin and Depledge 2004, 166). CDM activities are expected to create
emission credits worth billions of dollars (Wara 2006).
Discussion of the autonomy of trustee agents in international relations has so
far largely centered on international courts and adjudication bodies. Interna-
tional or supranational courts such as the European Court of Justice, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, and the World Trade Organization Appellate
Body are beyond doubt among the most autonomous trustees in international
relations. The adherents of principal-agent theory emphasize that the member
states of relevant institutions always retain the power to re-contract and thus
create a permanent threat of sanctions (Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998). In
contrast, judicial governance scholars argue that the principals’ ability to use this
power and to curtail the autonomy of adjudicative trustees is severely restricted
(e.g., Alter 2006; Burley and Mattli 1993). Remarkably, the conflict has been lar-
gely framed as a dyadic one on whether decisions reflect the preferences of the
principals or those of their agents. Only recently, Alter (2008, 40) suggested that
trustees decide in the interests of some ‘‘putative beneficiary that differs from
the principal’’ and that this beneficiary may be an entirely artificial construction.
While this suggestion originates from inductive inference rather than from
deductive reasoning, it draws attention to an important aspect of trusteeship
decision making: Trustees can point to some external point of reference that
transforms the ever-looming dyadic conflict between principals and agents into a
triadic one.
Against the backdrop of the CDM approval mechanism, this article makes
three theoretically relevant contributions to the debate on the logic of delega-
tion to trustee agents and its accountability implications. First, it argues that trust-
eeship delegation always relies on a specific rationale for delegated decision
making as an external point of reference that is distinct from both the aggregate
preferences of the principals in a given decision situation and from possible pref-
erences of the trustee agents. In an evolving division of labor, the principals
define the rationale for trusteeship decision making, while trustees execute this
rationale in subsequent decisions. In this triadic relationship, trustees cannot
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simply replace the preferences of their principals by their own ones. In case of
tension with their principals on the content of a particular decision, however,
administrative or judicial trustees can refer to these decision criteria (Alter
2008). The commonly accepted points of reference help preserve the autonomy
of trustee agents vis-a`-vis their principals and limit their autonomy to adopt arbi-
trary decisions that are difficult to justify in light of established decision criteria.
Second, accountability mechanisms ought to ensure that a trustee’s decisions
are in line with her externally given decision criteria. These criteria allow for
appraising these decisions. Appropriately designed accountability mechanisms
will seek to diminish the impact of power and parochial interests of all possibly
interested stakeholders, states, and non-state actors alike, while enhancing the
influence of interventions that advance particularly well-reasoned arguments.
Third, the article expands the empirical foundation of the discussion on trustee-
ship decision-making in international relations to administrative trustees that
pose somewhat different problems than adjudicative trustees. While both sorts of
trusteeship decision making share some characteristics and are charged with eval-
uating the merits of pending cases in light of valid decision criteria, decision
making by administrative trustees involves wider margins of discretion. It occurs
prior to a possible change in the state of affairs and it is not based upon a single
well-defined logic of reasoning. In contrast, adjudication by independent courts
follows the well-established logic of legal reasoning, it evaluates an existing state
of affairs after the fact, and it relies on the fiction that it is limited to the applica-
tion of existing rules to specific cases (Shapiro 1981; Stone Sweet 2004, 5).
In the first part of this article, we examine two different logics of delegation
and their implications for the design of appropriate accountability mechanisms.
We then discuss arrangements to hold trustee agents accountable for their deci-
sions. Subsequently, we briefly explore the relevance of the proper operation of
the CDM for the success of the Kyoto Protocol and the reasons for the remark-
ably far-reaching delegation of decision powers. Against this backdrop, we
explore the incentives created by the existing institutional arrangement for the
making of CDM decisions. While not intervening into the day-to-day operation
of the CDM, the Conference of the Parties (CoP) as the regime’s supreme deci-
sion-making body has enacted a set of substantive standards and tight proce-
dures. Delegated decision making about CDM projects involves several bodies
with specific functions and is closely observed by the interested public, thus
establishing a system of horizontal accountability among these bodies and actors.
Finally, we examine three contentious project-specific decisions to explore obsta-
cles to criteria-based CDM decision making. Such obstacles originate from uncer-
tainty and the partial absence of reliable decision criteria. We conclude that the
CDM arrangements provide a model for nonpartisan international regulation.
Accountability of Trustee Agents in International Institutions
The Decision Rationale of Trustee Agents
Delegation of decision-making competencies can follow either of two distinct
theoretical logics (Majone 2001b). Principals may establish an agent to reduce
transaction costs by relieving themselves of certain tasks, acquiring expertise, or
limiting the complexity of decisionmaking (Hawkins et al. 2006, 12–20; Koremenos,
Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 766). Principals may also establish a trustee to protect
their own well-perceived long-term interests.
Agents established to reduce the transaction costs of decision making are,
despite the evolving division of labor, expected to apply the same decision ratio-
nale as their principals would have done in their place. Accordingly, this type of
delegation typically creates the well-known dyadic principal-agent constellation.
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Principals seek to establish oversight arrangements and make the agents ‘‘verti-
cally’’ (Schmitter 1999) or ‘‘hierarchically’’ accountable to themselves (Grant
and Keohane 2005, 36), because agents might otherwise pursue their own inter-
ests (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Moe 1990, 121). Oversight intensity is merely
limited by the costs of monitoring and controlling an agent’s activities. Agents
should face significant sanctions if deviating from their principal’s expectations
(e.g., limitation or redefinition of competencies, budgetary constraints, and
changes of personnel) to create a rational expectation that it is in their own
interest to follow the decision rationale of their principals as closely as possible
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). The limitation of
an agent’s decision-making powers to preparatory functions is the predominant
arrangement within international institutions for ensuring that the principals’
decision rationale is not violated. In this case, an agent will have to anticipate
the aggregate preferences of her principals to gain influence. This is true for the
secretariats of international environmental regimes, such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (Gehring and Ruffing 2008), for the
powerful administration of the World Bank (Nielson and Tierney 2003),
and even for the Commission of the European Union, which is closely supervised
by the Council of Ministers as well as numerous committees attended by the
member states (Pollack 1997).
Trustee agents established to execute the member states’ long-term interests
are expected to apply a rationale that is systematically different from what their
principals would have done in their place. Rational actors will gain an interest in
committing themselves credibly to their long-term interest (Moravcsik 1998;
Shepsle 1991), if their preferences are inconsistent over time (Elster 1979, 67–8;
Majone 2001b). In this case, their action in a specific decision situation threatens
to violate their long-term interests. The classic example is a government that
negotiates with hostage-takers and thereby creates incentives for future crimes
(Keech 1995, 38–40). Typically, the principals define at a given point in time t0 a
long-term interest, while being tempted to act, in a subsequent decision situation
t1, according to other, possibly equally sound, decision considerations, so that
their long-term interest turns out to be undermined at point t2. Accordingly, a
trustee agent serves her principals best by executing the principals’ well-
perceived long-term interest, and by not adjusting to what her principals would
have done in her place. The resulting decisions are expected to be ‘‘better’’ than
those directly influenced by the principals.
In contrast to a regular principal-agent relationship, the relationship between
principals and a trustee agent is triadic. The solution of conflicts between a
trustee agent and her principals over the appropriate decision in a particular
case is not simply a matter of hierarchy and power. The trustee agent can refer
to the principals’ previously defined long-term interests and ought to honor this
external point of reference, even if facing pressure to adapt to the principals’
case-specific preferences. It is not necessary to assume that trustee agents make
their decisions on behalf of some putative beneficiary distinct from their princi-
pals, as Alter (2008, 40) suggested. This would imply that the trustee knew sys-
tematically better than her principals. It suffices to recognize that trustees can
justify their decisions by referring to some decision criteria that are externally
given. The triadic setting redefines the heavily discussed issue of how much
autonomy trustee agents enjoy. While the adherents of principal-agent theory
emphasize that the member states of relevant institutions always retain the
power to re-contract and thus create a permanent threat of sanctions (Garrett,
Kelemen, and Schulz 1998), judicial governance scholars argue that existing
restrictions to using this power preserve the autonomy of court-trustees (Alter
2006; Burley and Mattli 1993). Ideally, trustee agents ought to be fully pro-
tected from their principals’ intervention into their day-to-day business, while
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not enjoying any autonomy to deviate from the decision criteria defined by
their principals.
The sincere execution of a trustee’s tasks requires reason-based discourse and
arguing, rather than preference aggregation and power-based bargaining. Argu-
ing originates from the Habermasian concept of communicative action (Elster
1998; Risse 2000). In an arguing process (discourse), disputes are settled
through the collective assessment of the reasons accompanying disputed proposi-
tions against commonly accepted criteria. It entangles the participants in a learn-
ing process. Discursive settlement of conflicts starkly contrasts with bargaining,
that is, the arm-twisting mode of coordination that focuses on distributive effects
and relies on credible threats and promises (Elster 1989, 50–96). While a bar-
gaining outcome is as ‘‘good’’ as any other, because commonly accepted evalua-
tion criteria are absent, discourse promises to produce decisions that are
particularly well-reasoned in light of the decision criteria applied. Hence, an
ideal trustee will evaluate the merits of existing options sincerely in light of the
externally given decision criteria and choose the most convincing one.
Accountability Mechanisms in Trusteeship Relations
A prerequisite for any well-designed accountability mechanism is the definition
of appropriate decision criteria as external points of reference for all actors
involved. Substantive criteria indicate the long-term interests, as defined by the
principals, against which action of power-wielding agents can be judged. They
provide the most definitive set of instructions principals can give to their trustees
and create an important ex ante accountability mechanism (Huber 2000, 400).
Without such standards, a trustee lacks substantive guidance when having to
appraise different options. Binding decision criteria create a sort of administra-
tive law and thus legalize the institutional law-making process. Administrative law
is a well-known instrument for controlling independent regulatory agencies in
domestic political systems and in the European Union (Shapiro 2001). More-
over, binding substantive decision criteria commit all other actors involved,
including the principals and private applicants, to the same set of standards.
While substantive decision criteria emerge from intergovernmental negotia-
tions, the ensuing division of labor between principals and their trustee agents
limits the room for power-based maneuvering among the former. In spite of the
intense discussion on the legitimacy of international institutions and the lack of
external accountability of international decisions to the broader public (Keohane
2003, 141), it is difficult to see actors that were better legitimized than states and
equally well-equipped to define the long-term interests of international society,
nor that there are coordination mechanisms that were more appropriate than
intergovernmental negotiations for this task. Whereas intergovernmental bargain-
ing does not always lead to the common good, especially because of distributive
interests of the negotiating parties (Elster 1989), the delegation of decision-
making functions to a trustee agent contributes to limiting the maneuvering
room for bargaining and pure preference aggregation. If principals intend to
shield case-specific decisions from their immediate influence, they can affect the
final decisions only through well-crafted general rules. Accordingly, they are
forced to be consistent across cases (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, 28–31).
Actors may even be precluded from clearly assessing their overall preferences
across cases, if rules and procedures last for an unknown period of time and the
universe of future cases is unknown. Under these conditions, states tend to
operate under a Rawlsian ‘‘veil of ignorance’’ (Rawls 1971, 136–42) which will
encourage even rational utility maximizers to engage in the common search of
arrangements that promise acceptable outcomes irrespective of their distributive
consequences.
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Trustee agents can be made accountable for their activity through a number
of interrelated mechanisms which together must provide sufficiently strong
incentives to ensure that decisions are reasonable, or problem-adequate, in light
of the externally given decision criteria. The specific relationship between a trus-
tee and her principals defines the design conditions for appropriate accountabil-
ity arrangements. These arrangements ought both to protect a trustee’s
autonomy vis-a`-vis her principals and to limit her ability to deviate from sincerely
applying relevant decision criteria provided by the principals. By requiring the
trustee to give account, they shall ensure that decisions are particularly well-rea-
soned and thereby implement the principals’ long-term interests. Accountability
arrangements may require specific forms of divided labor that assign separate
decision functions to several actors (Gehring and Krapohl 2007). Functionally
differentiated decision-making systems are organized according to their decision
procedures that constitute institutional opportunity structures and assign
selected powers to various types of actors (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast 1987).
First, the internal composition helps both commit a trustee agent to existing
decision criteria and narrow the margins for arbitrary decisions. It constitutes an
internal accountability mechanism. In international relations, political or judicial
decisions are usually assigned to committees or court chambers, rather than to
individuals or hierarchically organized bureaucracies. Corporate agents create a
specific form of committee governance (Sartori 1987, 227–32). Their members
tend to be faced with a stream of parallel decisions of comparatively limited
scope, each of which will hardly allow the accommodation of all preferences.
Actors seeking to pursue case-specific parochial interests (e.g., preferences of
their government or any other relevant stakeholder) will bring committee deci-
sion-making to a stop and jeopardize cooperation altogether. Hence, committee
governance requires preparedness to link decisions implicitly over time. If only
the indifferent members without specific interests in a given case tend toward
the solution that is best accommodated with the externally given decision crite-
ria, this solution will almost certainly provide the focal point (Schelling 1960,
99–118) around which the expectations of all members converge. The con-
straints of committee governance and the necessity to find a common focal point
generate a strong tendency to engage in the deliberative search for solutions that
are in conformity with the mandatory decision criteria.
Second, the establishment of a system of checks and balances among different
agents makes these agents ‘‘horizontally’’ accountable to each other (O’Donnell
1999), and helps preclude that they overstep their margins of discretion. A
case-specific decision does not have to be delegated to a single trustee. On the
one hand, the scientific or technical preparation of a decision may be dealt
with separately from its final adoption. A subsystem which is responsible for
the technical or scientific preparation provides a niche for expertise. Experts
will gain an incentive to submit convincing recommendations, if their conclu-
sions have to be accepted by another body to become effective. Recommenda-
tions submitted by a preparatory expert body will almost automatically change
the situation of the subsequent decision body, because they set the agenda for
this stage and enhance the costs of deviating decisions (Gehring 1999; Pollack
1997)—unless there are good reasons for this step. On the other hand, specific
review procedures may be established that make a trustee agent directly
accountable to another trustee agent. Judicial oversight of agency decision
making constitutes an important pillar of accountability within domestic politi-
cal systems (Shapiro 1988) and within the European Union (Gehring and
Krapohl 2007). Unfortunately, effective mechanisms for judicial control of
administrative decision making within international institutions are largely
absent from international relations. A rare exception is the review procedure
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within the World Bank, with an inspection panel in its center (Clark, Fox, and
Treakle 2003).
Third, a trustee, or a more complex decision-making system, may be held
externally accountable to the wider public. Evidently, this type of accountability
must not replace the decisions of the former with the preferences of the lat-
ter. Instead, interested public actors, including non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), may be granted an opportunity to follow decision making and, possi-
bly, to intervene with arguments and information. Competent non-state actors
can support delegated decision making directed at identifying the most prob-
lem-adequate solution. Observation of decision making by an interested public
increases the costs of adopting decisions that are unconvincing and less prob-
lem-adequate than possible, because such distortions will be more easily
detected. However, public access should be highly selective. Power-based pres-
sure by well-organized stakeholders would undermine the choice of reasonable
decisions, and unlimited access threatens to congest the decision process
altogether.
Fourth, decision-makers in all stages of the process can be mandated to ‘‘give
reasons’’ (Shapiro 2002) for their decisions to increase the incentive to adopt
well-reasoned decisions, rather than those based upon aggregated preferences
and power. The giving reasons requirement commits decision-makers to relate
their decisions expressly to mandatory decision criteria, and it facilitates the ex
post appraisal of intermediate or final decisions in light of valid criteria. It also
forces advocates of partisan interests to justify their interests with reasons that
convince other actors (Elster 1998, 104).
Finally, even a trustee will always be externally accountable to her principals
that have granted, and can at any time revoke authority (Grant and Keohane
2005, 29). This is the most sensitive part of a comprehensive accountability
scheme. While principals retain their power to re-contract, that is, to redefine
the trustee’s task or to withdraw decision-making authority altogether, they can-
not use this power without jeopardizing the proper operation of the regulatory
system altogether. Any intervention into the day-to-day business of the trustee
agent will inevitably undermine her ability to act according to the principals’ pre-
viously defined long-term interests. Therefore, this form of external accountabil-
ity must remain latent; it is not suitable for the fine-tuning of the trustee’s
case-specific decisions. However, the member states may well readjust substantive
criteria and procedures at any time so as to direct the regulatory process.
This will be particularly important, if delegated decisions appear to be not in
conformity with decision criteria, or if the principals’ long-term interests have
changed over time.
These mechanisms are to some degree functionally equivalent. Together, they
reduce the risk that trustees abuse their competencies, while avoiding ad hoc
intervention of principals into case-specific decision making. Trustee decision-
makers are systematically deprived of their ability to bargain or to pursue parti-
san interests, because badly reasoned (unconvincing) decisions do not remain
undetected. If the regulatory system is carefully designed, so as to ensure that
regulatory decisions are not systematically distorted by the undesired interven-
tion of powerful stakeholders, accountability will be incorporated into the intra-
institutional decision process and the principals can afford to abstain from over-
seeing day-to-day activities of their trustees directly. In this case, effective internal
(horizontal) accountability of decision-makers to other actors within the deci-
sion-making system ensures that decisions are in line with the substantive rules
that reflect the long-term interests of the principals. And vice versa: less effective
internal accountability will create undesired autonomy for trustees and increase
the necessity for intervention by the principals, even though this might tacitly
undermine the established division of labor.
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The Nature of CDM Decision Making
The CDM promises to make climate protection policy more cost-effective. It
allows industrialized countries (annex-I-countries), or private companies located
in these countries, to discharge part of their emission reduction obligations
under the Kyoto Protocol through projects located in developing countries
(non-annex-I-countries). If energy efficiency in the host country is lower than in
the industrialized country, a given reduction of emissions can be achieved with
lower investment efforts than at home. CDM projects are expected to create
emission credits worth billions of dollars (Wara 2006). By the end of 2007,
approved CDM projects amounted to more than 100 million certified emission
reductions (CERs), each equivalent to 1 T of CO2 emissions. Given that a CER
sells currently (May 2008) at about €16 (25 US$), and within the European
Union even at about €25 (40 US$; http://www.carbonpositive.net), approved
CDM projects have a volume of about 2.5 billion US$—with a dramatic increase
in projects and volume (see Table 1). Profits are attractive, because investment
costs for many project types are quite low (Wara 2006).
However, the CDM can seriously undermine the commitment system of the
Kyoto Protocol if it is poorly administered (Meijer and Werksman 2005, 192). A
CDM project creates emission reduction credits that are subtracted from the
obligations of the relevant industrialized country, whereas the host country does
not incur any reduction obligations under the current Protocol. CERs may be
transformed into tradable emission permits and sold to other member states (for
the European Union, see Lefevre 2005). The overly generous creation of CERs
from poorly evaluated CDM projects would thus seriously undermine the collec-
tive intention of the member states to stabilize, or reduce, greenhouse gas
emissions (Yamin and Depledge 2004, 166).
The administration of the CDM raises a serious credible commitment prob-
lem. While all member states should have a long-term interest in the sincere
operation of the approval mechanism, they tend to pursue different interests in
regard to a particular project. Countries expecting difficulties in fulfilling their
emission reduction obligations depend on the approval of a sufficient number
of CDM projects (Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow 2002). They require protec-
tion against an overly restrictive application of the CDM and should be confident
that emission reductions from costly projects located abroad are sincerely cred-
ited to their emission budgets. However, they have a systematic interest in the
generous approval of their own CDM projects, even if tacitly undermining the
Protocol’s overall reduction scheme. In contrast, countries intending to imple-
ment their reduction obligations at home are interested in ensuring that CDM
projects do not create tradable emission certificates without corollary emission
reductions, because this would disadvantage their economies and jeopardize cli-
mate protection efforts. They might favor an overly restrictive approval of CDM
project, because they do not benefit at all from these projects. Developing coun-
tries welcome the generous approval of CDM projects, which promises access to
capital and energy-efficient technology, but they also have an interest in not
allowing industrialized countries to slip away from their obligations to protect
the global climate.
TABLE 1. Increase in Project Activities and Issued CERs
2005 2006 2007
Registered projects 14 387 895
Issued CERs – 17,050,760 102,544,493
Source: Kyoto Protocol Secretariat; CER, certified emission reduction.
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Due to their divergent interests regarding specific CDM projects, the member
states would almost surely have been confronted with continuing decision prob-
lems, if they had chosen to approve CDM projects during their annual CoP
meetings. The CDM has been promoted by states that were reluctant to engage
in significant emission reductions, including the United States, because it allows
greater flexibility and cost-effectiveness in fulfilling the reduction-commitments
(Yamin and Depledge 2004, 46), but it aroused criticism by the European Union,
some developing countries like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and
environmental NGOs, all of them fearing that it could provide a loophole in the
Kyoto Protocol (Meijer and Werksman 2005, 192; Schro¨der 2001, 86). As the
scheme is not self-enforcing, but requires significant secondary decision making,
every single decision on a project or package of projects would almost inevitably
be burdened with the general conflict over the appropriateness of the CDM
scheme. Moreover, considering the size of possible investments and the systemat-
ically mixed motives of virtually all groups of member states involved, it would
be all too optimistic to assume that states would, in the absence of an effective
commitment to nonpartisan and criteria-based evaluation of CDM projects, sys-
tematically avoid bargaining over the compilation of project packages and their
distributive effects. The occasionally occurring struggle over specific decision
criteria and even over the treatment of comparatively limited project types (see
below: The HFC Avoidance Projects) illustrates the continuing potential for inter-
governmental conflict and the preparedness of the member states to preserve
their interests by bargaining.
The nature of the decision problem explains why the member states could
agree, in their own interests, on establishing a decision-making apparatus that is,
in its day-to-day business, remarkably independent from direct intervention by
the CoP. In assigning project decisions to a trustee agent, they avoided perma-
nent conflict and committed themselves credibly to their collectively defined
long-term interest.
Accountability of an Administrative Trustee: The Approval of CDM Projects
The procedural rules enacted by the CoP reflect the intention of the Kyoto
Protocol parties to produce CDM approval decisions in a process that is not
dominated by partisan political forces. Approval decisions are fully assigned to
the CDM Executive Board composed of 10 experts and 10 alternates from the
member states acting in a personal capacity. The Board members are elected for
a period of 2 years. They may serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. Only
the Board itself may, for serious reasons, suspend and ask the CoP to terminate
the membership of one of its members (Decision 3 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto Protocol
2005a, 6-29).1
Member states sacrificing their power to influence the content of important
decisions through traditional intergovernmental bargaining must be sure that
the approval procedure will produce acceptable results. They seek to ensure
through several accountability mechanisms that power-based interventions by
states and non-state stakeholders are systematically sorted out and approval
decisions are consistent with their general intentions.
Substantive Decision Criteria as Commonly Accepted Points of Reference
As part of its Marrakech Accords of 2001, the CoP adopted a voluminous set of
detailed substantive provisions establishing the approval process and defining
the rights and responsibilities of the actors involved. These rules were refined
1 Documents are available at the homepage of the regime: http://www.unfccc.int.
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later and approved in 2005 by the members of the Kyoto Protocol upon the
treaty’s entry into force.
The most important substantive approval criterion is the requirement that
emission reductions achieved by a CDM project be additional to any that would
have occurred in the absence of the project. Projects shall generate real, measur-
able, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change (Kyoto
Protocol, art. 12). The additionality criterion is an indispensable condition for
the appropriate operation of the CDM. If credited emission reductions were not
additional, CDM projects would inevitably undermine the general scheme of the
Protocol (see above: The Nature of CDM Decision-Making). The criterion is
impartial and does not privilege certain member states over others. Accordingly,
the principle was not contested during the negotiations (Niizawa 2003; Sales and
Kherlakian Sabbag 2007).
The CoP has attempted to define the additionality criterion more clearly. Its
speculative nature and inherent vagueness originates from the necessity to elabo-
rate a counterfactual scenario of how emissions would have developed in the
absence of a proposed project (Meijer and Werksman 2005, 199–200; Repetto
2001, 311). The CoP stipulated that the baselines reflect a transparent and con-
servative account of approaches, assumptions, methodologies, parameters, data
sources, key factors, as well as relevant national policies and circumstances (Deci-
sion 3 ⁄CMP.1; Kyoto Protocol 2005a, 6-29). Moreover, it requested the approval
apparatus to develop suitable methodologies for the development of baselines
capable of proving that projects would otherwise not have been undertaken. In
2001, it adopted criteria for new methodologies for baselines and monitoring
(Decision 17 ⁄CP.7, UNFCCC 2001, 20-49). Ways of calculating additionality
have been compiled in a ‘‘Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of
Additionality’’ (Report on EB 39 [2008], Kyoto Protocol 2008, 6).
Other substantive criteria commit the decision-makers to more specific guide-
lines applying to particular cases. The CoP limited sink-related CDM projects
to reforestation and afforestation activities and spelled out detailed eligibility
criteria for afforestation areas (Decision 5 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto Protocol 2005a, 61-
80)—thus excluding other possible sinks such as subsoil storage of compressed
greenhouse gases (Scholz and Noble 2005, 266). It excluded nuclear power sta-
tions from CDM activities (Decision 17 ⁄CP.7, UNFCCC 2001, 20-49). It declared
that local, regional, or national policies and standards cannot be considered as
CDM projects, whereas projects under a local, regional, or national program of
action can, if meeting the general requirements (Decision 7 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto Proto-
col 2005a, 93-99). It stipulated that an increase of emissions as a consequence of
an emission-reducing CDM project (leakage) shall be part of the calculation.
These criteria limit the discretion of the CDM approval apparatus considerably,
but they are obviously more prone to political compromise. For example, the
exclusion of nuclear power stations surely reflects a broadly shared position
among environmentally concerned countries and NGOs, but it removes from the
CDM an emission reduction technique that is employed in industrialized coun-
tries and does become part of the calculation of emissions and emission reduc-
tions of these countries.
Some other possible criteria for the eligibility of CDM projects have not been
adopted by the CoP and are thus not subject to CDM decision making. Demanding
that CDM projects do not divert funds from established development aid, develop-
ing countries had, unsuccessfully, attempted to expand the additionality criterion
to developmental considerations (Yamin and Depledge 2004, 177). Despite some
vague language within the Kyoto Protocol (art. 12), CDM decision-makers are also
not mandated to assess whether a proposed project contributes to sustainable
development, while member states as well as companies and organizations may
voluntarily require a sustainability check for their projects (Kenber 2005, 272–8).
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The substantive criteria enacted by the member states narrow the discretion in
the approval process and thus bind the approval apparatus. Although providing
the clearest possible degree of guidance in general terms, they still leave a con-
siderable margin for interpretation (Niizawa 2003). In essence, they reflect a set
of points that should be considered when evaluating a methodology and validat-
ing a project, rather than readily applicable substantive standards. However, they
require the Executive Board to provide convincing reasons for the support of its
decisions and may thus serve as standards for the appraisal of its activities.
The Approval of Assessment Methodologies: Strong Accountability Mechanisms Ensure Reasonable
Application of General Decision Criteria
Several accountability mechanisms are intended to ensure that the Executive
Board sincerely adheres to its task and does not abuse its competencies. The
approval of assessment methodologies for the validation of CDM projects is the
Board’s most far-reaching task, because it amounts to rule-making. In essence, a
methodology for the calculation of emission reductions of a particular project
type constitutes a set of more detailed validation criteria. Also, approved method-
ologies are published and may be employed by other applicants for their own
projects. If approval decisions are to be made in a nonpartisan and problem-ori-
ented manner, the accountability mechanisms must create sufficient incentives
to ensure that stakeholders are deprived of their ability to resort to their bargain-
ing power or, at least, that such action does not successfully influence the con-
tent of approval decisions.
First, the country-specific composition of the Board and its decision rules help
sort out parochial interests, which members might occasionally seek to pursue,
and make the members internally accountable to each other. Its 10 members
and 10 alternates originate from four industrialized countries committed to spec-
ified emission reductions and six developing countries representing possible host
countries of CDM projects.2 Decisions are to be made by consensus whenever
possible, otherwise by a three-fourths majority. Accordingly, any attempt by one
of the two possible camps to pursue partisan interests will immediately slow down
the speed of the decision-making process or block it altogether (Matsuo 2004,
233–4). The Board is thus subject to the influence of committee governance
(Sartori 1987, 227–32) and the necessity to find a commonly accepted focal
point for every single decision. As a methodology focuses on very specific types
of projects, it will be difficult to simply accommodate the preferences of all
Board members through bargaining. If only the indifferent members tend
toward the solution that is best accommodated with the mandatory decision cri-
teria, this solution will almost certainly provide the focal point on which the
expectations of all members converge. In practice, the implications of committee
governance are reinforced by the fact that the Board members act in a personal
capacity and that the Board decides almost exclusively by consensus (Netto and
Barani Schmidt 2005, 178).
Second, the approval procedure creates a multistage decision process and
involves several different actors (see Figure 1). An assessment methodology is
always elaborated by a private or state-related applicant. Applicants have an inter-
est in overestimating the emission reductions generated by their CDM projects
and in promoting methodologies resulting in comparatively high baselines
2 The Board is composed of one member from each of the UN-regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the
Carribean, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Others) as well as two other members from Annex I
Parties (industrialized countries), two other members from Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) and one
member from the AOSIS. See Rules of Procedure for the Executive Board, Dec. 4 ⁄ CMP.1, 32, Kyoto Protocol
2005a.
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(Niizawa 2003, 99), but they must seek to convince the approval apparatus that
their proposed methodology is in line with the general criteria. In this sense,
applicants set the agenda, but they are accountable to the subsequent stages of
the approval apparatus. Submitted methodologies are evaluated by the Method-
ologies Panel, a subsidiary body of the Executive Board. The Panel is charged
with advising the Board on methodologies for the establishment of baselines and
monitoring procedures. Its 15 members are experts acting in their personal
capacity (Report on EB 02 [2002], Kyoto Protocol 2002, 9). The Panel consti-
tutes the center of expertise in the approval process, but it does not have final
decision power. It scrutinizes every submitted methodology thoroughly in a
police patrol manner (for the difference between accountability mechanisms
following the designs of ‘‘police patrol’’ and ‘‘fire alarm,’’ see McCubbins and
Schwartz 1987). Formally, the Panel merely enjoys an advisory function. Its
influence on the final decisions depends on whether or not its recommendations
are accepted by the Executive Board. It provides detailed reasons explaining its
recommendations. Hence, the Methodologies Panel as a whole is accountable to
the Executive Board and has a strong incentive to generate sound expert advice,
even if individual members might occasionally have personal preferences or pur-
sue the interests of stakeholders. The final decisions are made by the Executive
Board. However, the agenda for Board discussions is set by the Methodologies
Panel’s assessment and recommendation. Board members desiring to promote
decisions deviating from Panel recommendations must persuade most of their
co-members that their position is more convincing than the recommendation of
the Panel. So far, the Executive Board has taken the opinions of the Methodolo-
gies Panel very seriously. Only in four out of the first 45 registered methodolo-
gies did the Board decide more rigidly than the Panel had recommended
(http://www.cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies).
Third, the decision-making bodies are externally accountable to the interested
public. Public observers constitute an additional ‘‘fire alarm’’ system. While not
having formal rights to complain or challenge a decision, they may alert member
states. The procedure is highly transparent and provides opportunities for the
interested public (e.g., NGOs and research institutes) to submit statements.
Proposed methodologies are, together with a comment form, made public on
the Internet. Comments from the public have to be considered by the Methodo-
logies Panel. Evidently, this access is highly selective. Only technically or
evaluates methodologies
decides upon
methodologies
FIG. 1. Methodology Approval Procedure
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scientifically competent actors can successfully seize the opportunity to influence
the evaluation process by providing reasonable arguments or relevant informa-
tion related to the valid decision criteria. Meetings of the Executive Board are
also open to observers from all member states and from accredited organizations
(i.e., mostly NGOs). Most parts of the discussion are even broadcast via Internet,
and technical documents are made public upon adoption of the decision.
Hence, Board members cannot expect that badly reasoned decisions will remain
undetected (Meijer and Werksman 2005, 205).
Finally, the Executive Board is generally accountable to the CoP. The Board
reports regularly to the CoP and its reports are discussed in the plenary. While
the CoP does not comment on single projects, it carefully observes activities, at
least in the current start-off period. It also seems to be prepared to readjust the
framework of substantive and procedural regulations, if deemed appropriate. In
guidance documents, it responds to questions raised by the Executive Board and
requests the Board to undertake certain measures (e.g., Decision 7 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto
Protocol 2005a, 93-99) or elaborate further rules (Decision 3 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto Pro-
tocol 2005a, 6-29). The CoP is also formally empowered to request revision of
approved methodologies (Decision 3 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto Protocol 2005a, 6-29), but it
is not entitled to adopt its own ones. This CoP intervention power cannot be
more that an ‘‘emergency break,’’ because its employment would automatically
undermine the division of labor between the principals and their administrative
trustee. For the regular revision of the general direction of approval decision-
making, the CoP will have to adjust its general rules, rather than intervening into
specific decisions.
Altogether, the procedure for the approval of new methodologies is designed
to deprive all bodies and individual decision-makers involved of their ability to
deviate from well-reasoned decisions consistent with the general criteria. While
influence by the Methodologies Panel (i.e., the formally weakest body) relies
almost exclusively on its expertise, the Executive Board is, by several complemen-
tary accountability mechanisms, deprived of its ability to compromise and bar-
gain. Actors from the broader public can intervene into the process, but only
with convincing arguments. The CoP, although able to request revision of an
approved methodology, is kept from simply replacing an undesired decision by
its own, and it cannot easily intervene into the regular approval process.
Project-Specific Decisions: Several Layers of Accountability
The validation of CDM projects and the eventual certification of emission reduc-
tion credits are assigned to ‘‘operational entities’’ (i.e., private technical auditing
firms contracted by the applicants of CDM projects). Validation is the assessment
of whether or not a project meets the relevant criteria and whether or not the
methodologies are correctly applied; it ends with the registration, or rejection, of
the project. Verification refers to the assessment of whether or not the projected
emission reductions have actually been realized. One operational entity assesses
a proposed CDM project in the validation stage and issues a request for registra-
tion of the project, if it finds the eligibility criteria to be fulfilled (Decision
3 ⁄CMP.1, Annex, Kyoto Protocol 2005a, 14-17). A different operational entity
audits the regular assessment reports by the applicants of a CDM project in the
certification stage and regularly monitors the project according to the monitor-
ing methodology. Auditing includes on-site visits. Eventually, this second opera-
tional entity recommends to issue emission reduction credits, if it finds the
reports to be reliable. A validated CDM project is automatically registered after
8 weeks, and the request to certify emission reduction credits is accepted after
15 days, unless a review is requested by competent actors (Decision 17 ⁄CP.7,
UNFCCC 2001, 20-49 and Decision 4 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto Protocol 2005a, 30-60).
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Several accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure that operational enti-
ties testify sincerely. These entities compete for validation and certification con-
tracts and could be tempted to evaluate the project more positively than
justified. However, they face two severe sanctions for false testimony. On the one
hand, they can lose their reputation and market opportunities. Operational
entities must be accredited by the Executive Board and designated by the CoP.
Accreditation is reviewed periodically and there is a constant threat of nonrenew-
al3. On the other hand, an operational entity may be held liable for emission
credits that are falsely issued because of incorrect certification (Decision
17 ⁄CP.7, UNFCCC 2001, 20-49; Yamin and Depledge 2004, 172). Therefore,
operational entities tend to refuse projects that are considered as incompatible
with CDM criteria (Michaelowa 2005, 145).
Operational entities are directly accountable to the Executive Board, which
has the formal right of facultative review. This right has been used intensely, so
that the original ‘‘fire alarm’’ mechanism has been tacitly transformed into a
‘‘police patrol’’ mechanism (McCubbins and Schwartz 1987). A review of the
request to register a project or to certify emission credits may be demanded by
each of the parties involved in the project or by at least three members of the
Executive Board. The demand must be accompanied by reasons associated with
the validation or certification requirements and by supporting documentation
(Decision 4 ⁄CMP.1, Kyoto Protocol 2005a, 30-60). The actors formally entitled to
instigate review proceedings may be alerted by interested non-state actors, as
project documents, as well as the findings of the operational entity, are made
public on the Internet and comments are invited. In case of review, two Board
members, possibly supported by outside experts, examine the request, and the
Board adopts the final decision. More recently, the Executive Board has set up a
Registration and Issuance Team (comprised of independent experts and chaired
by a Board member) that routinely assesses the requests and alerts the Board, if
a review is appropriate (Kyoto Protocol 2006c, Annex 43). Reviews are mainly
requested because of doubts about the additionality of the project and about the
correct application of the approved methodologies. They tend to result in the
more stringent appraisal of projects (http://www.cdm.unfccc.int/projects).
In the review process, the discretion of the Executive Board is limited by
accountability mechanisms similar to those related to the approval of new meth-
odologies (see above: The Approval of Assessment Methodologies). It cannot
request reviews at will, because the scientific opinion submitted by the Registra-
tion and Issuance Team, which is made up of external experts, can only be
rejected with good reasons. During the process, the internal restriction imposed
on the body by its composition tends to preclude bargaining. Finally, opportunis-
tic decisions would undermine the reputation of the Board, as its activity is
closely observed by many states and non-state actors.
Having effectively sorted out the latent intergovernmental conflict among the
member states from day-to-day approval activities, the institutional arrangement
has tacitly created a new transnational tension between the mostly private appli-
cants and the public approval authorities that produced demand for an addi-
tional appeal procedure. Private firms, including multinationals from both
Annex I and Non-Annex I countries, play an important role within the CDM,
because their profit-seeking interests generate projects on which the success of
the CDM depends. Accordingly, the approval apparatus is increasingly subject to
market-based accountability (Grant and Keohane 2005, 36–7). Especially wrongly
negative decisions in the certification stage would immediately diminish the
3 As of May 2008, 18 operational entities had been designated by the CoP (http://www.cdm.unfccc.int/DOE).
Current operational entities include: the British Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance UK (SGS), the German Techni-
scher U¨berwachungsverein (TU¨V), and the Norwegian Det Norske Veritas (DNV).
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reputation of the whole CDM mechanism, because private firms would not dare
to invest in future CDM projects, if they could not be sure that resulting emis-
sion reductions were sincerely certified. Accordingly, applicants and investors
require reliable legal protection. However, the existing approval procedure is pri-
marily directed at preserving the public interest in the proper operation of the
CDM. Applicants may instigate review proceedings to challenge the findings of
the operational entities involved, but there is not yet a formal procedure for
reviewing the final decisions of the Executive Board. The absence of an institu-
tionalized appeal procedure might encourage aggrieved investors to bring cases
before suitable domestic courts.
Driven by this transnational tension within the CDM scheme, an additional
appeal procedure is currently evolving. In December 2006, the CoP approved an
interim procedure that is, in the first place, motivated by the intention to secure
the privileges and immunities of the Board members (see Decision 9 ⁄CMP.2,
Kyoto Protocol 2006a, 34-35 and Kyoto Protocol 2006b, 20-21). It enables
applicants to submit complaints against Board decisions to the head of the
Convention Secretariat (Decision 9 ⁄CMP.2, Kyoto Protocol 2006a, 34-35). The
Secretariat is empowered to analyze such complaints and may recommend that
the Executive Board revise relevant decisions. There have already been several
complaints, two of which have led to revised Board decisions (information pro-
vided by the Secretariat). Moreover, the Subsidiary Body on Implementation is
currently considering the establishment of a further dispute settlement mecha-
nism that would allow some kind of formal appeal (Kyoto Protocol 2006b, 17).
The new complaint procedure introduces a completely new layer of account-
ability into the approval procedure, but it does not fundamentally change the
existing arrangement. Henceforth, project-specific decisions of the Executive
Board will be under scrutiny by another body. Although this might jeopardize
the independence of the Board if abused by the newly introduced agent, delega-
tion of supervisory functions to another trustee, such as the Subsidiary Body on
Implementation, will almost automatically reinforce the rational expectation of
Board members that poorly reasoned decisions will not hold, and that the proce-
dural rights of applicants must be honored. Judicial review by specialized bodies
is known to foster legalization of social relations, because it privileges legal argu-
ments over power (Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart 2005, 44–6; Shapiro 2001).
Legal protection of the rights of investors will thus reinforce the accountability
of the trustee agent that has been invested by the member states with far-reach-
ing competencies to overcome their own credible commitment problems.
Altogether, the procedures for the validation and registration of new CDM
projects and for the certification of emission reduction credits limit the discre-
tion of all decision-making bodies. It is difficult to pursue partisan interests
unless they are supported by convincing reasons. The operational entities risk
losing their reputation, and their accreditation, when testifying too generously,
and the Executive Board cannot, in light of approved methodologies, afford to
deviate from problem-adequate decisions. As procedures are highly transparent,
both the operational entities and the Executive Board are supervised by member
states and the interested public, including NGOs. These external actors can, in
turn, only influence a particular decision, if their submissions are accompanied
by reasons that convince the members of the Executive Board. Their activity con-
stitutes an additional ‘‘fire alarm’’ arrangement. Whereas this procedure does
not exclude error or the exploitation of a residual margin of discrete choice, it
can be expected to ensure decisions that are not distorted by the prevailing dis-
tribution of power. However, the current discussion concerning an additional
appeal procedure demonstrates that the existing accountability arrangements
might still be tightened without re-politicizing approval decisions.
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How the Approval Apparatus Deals with Difficult Cases
A reliable decision-making system must be capable of convincingly dealing with
difficult cases. By the end of 2007, more than 200 methodologies and almost
1,000 projects had been validated (see Table 2). The appraisal of most method-
ologies and projects does not pose particular difficulties for the approval apparatus.
While all well-designed decision-making systems can satisfactorily process the easy
cases for which they have been established, difficult cases put to a test the ability
of the apparatus to actually sort out parochial interests and to produce well-rea-
soned, and therefore widely acceptable, decisions.
In this section, we examine three of the comparatively few cases that posed
serious difficulties to the apparatus and illustrate different types of obstacle to
reason-based decision making. The selected cases are thus decidedly not repre-
sentative for the universe of cases, because the selection is strongly biased toward
the difficult ones. Our main indicators for the existence of difficulties within the
approval procedure are the occurrence of lasting conflict among the decision
makers or the repeated consideration, or modified appraisal, of an application.
The Graneros Fuel Switching Project: Disputed Assessment of Additionality
The Graneros project illustrates how the system assesses, in comparatively ‘‘regu-
lar’’ cases, additionality of emission reductions in light of considerable uncer-
tainty and lacking precedents. In May 2003, the Swiss company Nestle´ applied
for a project intended to switch the fuel used at its food plant in Graneros
(Chile) from coal and diesel to natural gas. The measures would be additional,
because in this region of Chile gas is more expensive than coal. The generated
credits were to be sold to a Japanese power company (MGM International
Assurance Ltd. 2004). The project was supposed to reduce emissions by
432,960 T of CO2 over a 21-year period, with a market value of up to 10,000,000
US$ at current market prices (May 2008).
The submitted assessment methodology had to be revised before it was eventu-
ally approved. The desk reviewers of the Methodologies Panel and two public com-
ments criticized that the additionality criterion were not met, if the project
included replacement of equipment from the 1980s (http://www.cdm.unfccc.int/
methodologies). The Panel recommended a revision and resubmission (B-rating),
and suggested inter alia that the project should not increase the capacity and life-
time of the existing facility (Kyoto Protocol 2003e). The Executive Board followed
the recommendation of the Methodologies Panel. Neither the Board member
from Japan nor the alternates from Chile and Switzerland voiced any national
interests or tried to change the decision. (Kyoto Protocol 2003a, 3-4, and broadcast
of the meeting at http://unfccc.int/cdm.) Upon incorporation of the required
changes, the Methodologies Panel recommended acceptance, and the Executive
Board decided to register the methodology (Kyoto Protocol 2003b, 4).
Validation led to further adjustments of the project design and considerably
reduced the amount of emission credits involved. In response to changes of the
TABLE 2. Increasing Activity of the Approval Apparatus (Cumulative Figures)
2005 2006 2007
Approved methodologies 52 62 91
Rejected methodologies 57 79 112
Registered projects 14 387 895
Rejected projects – 6 52
Source. Kyoto Protocol Secretariat.
684 Reason-Based Decision Making
methodology, the project design had already been slightly downsized. The desig-
nated operational entity, namely Det Norske Veritas, required further changes,
concerning, inter alia, the lifetime of the boilers. Nestle´ had also to prove that
its environmental policy did not require realization of the project anyway.
Eventually, the operational entity issued a request for registration. However, the
Executive Board reviewed the project upon request by three of its members
(Joint Implementation Network 2004, 10-11). It complained, inter alia, that still
machinery from the 1950s and 1960s was involved, which would have to be
replaced in the foreseeable future. Following further changes, the project was
registered, but the crediting period was limited to the lifetime of the oldest
existing equipment within the plant, which significantly reduced the size of the
project (Kyoto Protocol 2005b, 8-9).
Altogether, the approval procedure operated as expected. While the applicants
attempted to overestimate emission reductions and proposed an assessment
methodology that confirmed their estimates, the Methodologies Panel and the
Executive Board took their assessment function very seriously without engaging
in a politicized struggle over distributive effects. The approval of assessment
methodologies and the validation of related projects were carefully observed by
competent non-state actors. Shortly after the registration of the project, the Exec-
utive Board adopted guidelines for treating the lifetime of plants and equipment
based upon this case (Kyoto Protocol 2005c, 5-6).
V&M do Brasil Avoided Fuel Switch Project: Doubts about the Eligibility
of an Entire Project Category
The V&M do Brasil project demonstrates that the allegedly technical assessment
of CDM projects can stir principled conflict about entire project categories. The
methodology applied for in March 2003 was the second submitted to the Meth-
odologies Panel. The project was intended to allow the Brazilian steel producing
plant to continue using charcoal instead of switching to the more environmen-
tally harmful, but (according to the project developers) cheaper coke. At that
time, the plant used charcoal from its own eucalyptus-plantations as a fuel. The
emission credits were to be sold to Toyota Tsusho from Japan and the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, purchasing emission certificates for the Dutch
government. The additionality of emission reductions from ‘‘avoided fuel switch
projects’’ is difficult to demonstrate, because credits are claimed for leaving
everything as it is. The applicants submitted price comparisons between charcoal
and coke, and they argued that several steel-producers in Brazil had already
switched to coke.
A first assessment methodology was rejected upon unanimous expert advice.
Upon preparation by the desk reviewers, the Methodologies Panel recommended
rejection of the methodology, because the application did not demonstrate con-
vincingly that coke was really cheaper than charcoal (Kyoto Protocol 2003f). The
Executive Board accepted this rating. Although the discussion in the Board did
not focus on details, it revealed that the members were still slightly unsure about
how to proceed in light of the pioneer case.
In the second round, the category of ‘‘avoided fuel switch projects’’ created
considerable tension among the experts involved. Only a few months after the
first rejection, the project developers handed in a new methodology (NM0029,
IFC-Netherlands Carbon Facility and Toyota Tsusho 2003). While some of the
criticized aspects had been altered, the project was supposed to generate almost
as many credits as the original version. Public comments recognized improve-
ments but still found mistakes, ambiguities, and subjective decisions. Some of
them openly doubted that the project type was suitable for the CDM (Kyoto
Protocol 2003g), especially as the ‘‘long-term benefit,’’ a basic eligibility criterion
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for CDM projects, was difficult to assess. The desk reviews complained about
incomplete and unclear data and strongly criticized the dependency on assump-
tions. One expert proved that there had been investments in new charcoal pro-
jects in Brazil and that the project might thus be cost-effective in itself. However,
the Methodologies Panel was not able to find a common position on the meth-
odology. It considered the issue to be a political one, because it dealt with a
whole project category. Consequently, it asked for ‘‘guidance of the Board…-
based on the…immaterial nature of the project activity and the moral hazard
that is related to the fact that the project activity consists of continuing current
practice’’ (Kyoto Protocol 2003d, 3).
The Executive Board was also deeply divided on the issue. In a fair debate
referring to the CDM criteria and other project examples, some members advo-
cated accepting the project type, while others desired to reject it, and a third
group supported a case-by-case approach (Kyoto Protocol 2003c, 3, broadcast of
the meeting at http://unfccc.int/resource/webcast/cdm/eb12/index.html).
Finally, the Methodologies Panel was instructed to develop further recommenda-
tions, but could not reach a consensus (Kyoto Protocol 2004a, 3). After this fail-
ure, the issue was put on hold for 11 months. In December 2004, the discussion
in the Board was repeated, with similar positions (Kyoto Protocol 2004b, 4).
Many members opposed projects based upon continuation of existing practices,
as they are technically difficult to monitor and provide a potential for blackmail,
because companies could threaten to switch fuel if they did not receive emission
credits. Other members argued that acceptable single cases might be found.
Eventually, the Board achieved consensus on assessing projects case-by-case. On
this basis, the Methodologies Panel recommended rejecting the submitted meth-
odology, because of lacking transparency and limited possibilities for validating
the project (Kyoto Protocol 2005e, 8). The Board approved this recommenda-
tion without discussion (Kyoto Protocol 2005d, 6).
This case draws attention to the limits of deliberative decision making in the
CDM approval system and the tendency of the actors involved to sidestep princi-
pled, and therefore more contentious, issues in favor of mutually agreed ‘‘techni-
cal’’ solutions. The project generated a clash between those fearing that avoided
fuel switch project would undermine the additionality criterion and those others
fearing that too strict an interpretation of the criteria would jeopardize the rele-
vance of the CDM altogether. This conflict was difficult to solve at the level of
principle. Therefore, the Board agreed eventually on the case-by-case consider-
ation of projects. However, this compromise did not extend to the particular
project-related methodology. Concerning this more limited, and therefore more
‘‘technical,’’ issue, both experts and Board members reached agreement.
The HFC Avoidance Projects: Can Supplementary Criteria be Applied?
The Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) 23 controversy demonstrates that decision making
is immediately threatened to be politicized, if the approval apparatus cannot rely on
general criteria. In April 2003, project developers submitted a methodology and
concepts for a HFC decomposition project in Ulsan (South Korea) and for a project
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by thermal oxidation of HFC 23 in Gujarat
(India). Both projects were intended to destroy HFC 23, a gas with a high-global
warming potential, which is regulated under the Kyoto Protocol. This gas is a by-
product of Hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) 22, an ozone-depleting substance
used as a refrigerant and regulated under theMontreal Protocol. The relevant meth-
odology NM0007 was approved accordingly as AM0001 (Kyoto Protocol 2003a, 3).
After the approval of the methodology (i.e., during validation of the projects
in question), public interventions raised general concern regarding the implica-
tions of the project. Projects of this type threatened to create an overly high
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return on investment because the costs for destroying HFC 23 are very low,
whereas the amount of emissions credits gained is high. It could become
attractive to produce HCFC 22 exclusively to gain HFC 23 for CDM projects
(Watanabe and Sterk 2007, 3). A public comment doubted that the project was
in conformity with basic principles of the Kyoto Protocol (http://www.cdm.
unfccc.int/Projects). A U.S. firm disputed the proposed calculation, and a Swiss
institute spelled out the problems of interaction with the Montreal Protocol
(http://www.cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/inputam0001).
The approval apparatus faced serious difficulties in dealing with this issue,
because the additionality of HFC 23 reductions had always been undisputed.
While the project type would be acceptable, if the CDM criteria were taken liter-
ally, it seemed to violate the intentions of the Protocol and raised issues of its
relationship with other international institutions (Schneider, Graichen, and Matz
2005). Recognizing that the existing CDM criteria did not provide a firm founda-
tion for the settlement of the conflict, the Board requested guidance from the
CoP (Kyoto Protocol 2004b, 3). The CoP referred the matter to the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). During SBSTA 22, 23,
and 24, especially China, which hosts several HFC-23 projects, rejected further
regulation (see Webcast on SBSTA 24, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
webcast/sb24/templ/ovw_str_sbi_english.html). In contrast, the European
Union and most developing countries favored a strict course to ensure the envi-
ronmental integrity of the Protocol. Both the CoP and the SBSTA are still con-
sidering the matter.
In the meantime, the Executive Board struggled with interim measures. In a
closed session, it decided to put the methodology on hold to enable a review by
the Methodologies Panel (Kyoto Protocol 2004c, 3). This was a remarkable
exception to the usual transparency of Board decision-making and stirred con-
cern of possible over-regulation behind closed doors. The Methodologies Panel
was faced with a revised methodology that excluded new HCFC 22 plants and
required conservative calculations for existing plants. This methodology, viewed
as restrictive by industry and consultants (MGM International Assurance Ltd
2005, 17), was later approved (AM0001-vers.3; Kyoto Protocol 2005d, 4, and
2005b, 5). The two original projects in South Korea and India had been tempo-
rarily put on hold (Kyoto Protocol 2004b, 7), but were later registered, because
their validation had been based upon the original methodology. Other HFC 23-
projects have been registered in the meantime based upon the new, compara-
tively restrictive methodology.
Where substantive decision criteria are lacking, reason-based administrative
decision making is immediately threatened with becoming politicized. Hence,
this case demonstrates on the one hand, that conflicts on the approval of
CDM projects are not at all trivial or of minor importance. There is a poten-
tial for fierce battle. Stakeholders and decision-makers tend to pursue prefer-
ences, if there is an opportunity. On the other hand, it emphasizes that the
absence of clear guidance provides such opportunity for the pursuit of parti-
san interests, because the commonly accepted point of reference is missing.
Clarifying such guidelines is a matter for the political bodies established under
the Protocol. However, these bodies faced similar difficulties. Against this back-
drop, the approval apparatus struggled to reduce the scope of the underlying
problem technically. By accepting a restrictive methodology that avoids the
main problem of encouraging undesired production of greenhouse gases (and
ozone-depleting substances) to create new CDM projects, the Executive Board
eventually resorted to a strict interpretation of its mandatory criteria, and has
continued to do so in revisions and clarifications of the methodology. Remark-
able is also the importance of the seemingly irrelevant accountability of the
approval apparatus to the broader public. Public interventions drew attention
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to the originally unrecognized problems involved in HFC 23 projects, and pub-
lic protest caused the Methodologies Panel and the Executive Board to resort
to an open decision-making process. Hence, the controversy emphasizes the
need for uncontested substantive decision criteria and highlights the power of
an external accountability mechanism relying on an informed, albeit selected,
public.
Conclusion
Assigning decision-making competencies to trustee agents creates a triadic con-
stellation. Analysts of delegation patterns emphasize that the relationship
between principals and agents is hierarchical. The former grant, and can revoke,
authority that is limited in scope and time, while the latter (should) operate
within the limits of granted authority. This is true for closely controlled agents
and comparatively autonomous trustees alike. However, trustee agents are largely
protected from direct intervention by their principals into their day-to-day busi-
ness. Their autonomy undermines the effectiveness of the fundamentally hierar-
chical relationship with their principals, because they are deliberately charged
with not closely following the preferences of their principals in a given decision
situation. Yet, even trustees are not entitled to replace their principals’ prefer-
ences simply with their own ones. Instead, they are commissioned to decide
according to some previously established decision criteria that are defined by
their principals and reflect the latter’s long-term interests. These decision criteria
intervene as a third entity into the otherwise dyadic relationship between princi-
pals and agents. In a successful trusteeship constellation, principals will, in their
own well-perceived long-term interest, only intervene into the day-to-day business,
if a trustee produces decisions that are not in line with the previously established
decision criteria. And a trustee agent can reject possible interference by her prin-
cipals by referring to these criteria.
As any other agent, trustees may abuse their powers and must, therefore, be
made accountable for their decisions. Ideally, accountability arrangements ought
to preserve the autonomy of a trustee from her principals’ interference into her
regular decision making as fully as possible. At the same time, they ought to
diminish as far as possible the trustee’s ability to sidestep or ignore the externally
provided decision criteria. For this reason, institutional arrangements must rely
predominantly on internal, or horizontal, accountability mechanisms. The most
important ones are the careful composition of a collective trustee agent, the divi-
sion of labor within the decision process among several trustee agents, and the giv-
ing reasons requirement. Complaint procedures relying on decisions of yet other
trustees, such as judicial review, can sustain the rational expectation that uncon-
vincing or badly reasoned decisions do not prevail. Trustees can also be made
selectively accountable to the wider public, because their task is to identify options
that are particularly well-reasoned in light of the externally provided decision cri-
teria. In contrast, the ever present accountability of a trustee to her principals will
undermine the delicate arrangement, unless it remains latent and focuses only on
the overall direction of the decision process, rather than its details.
The member states of the Kyoto Protocol have not only assigned the approval
of CDM projects to an Executive Board, they have also refrained from interven-
ing into the day-to-day business of this trustee. The arrangement does not
entirely replace political decisions with technocratic ones. By defining the deci-
sion criteria, and by readjusting them in light of experienced difficulties, the
CoP fulfills an important function within this complex decision-making system.
The exemption of certain types of projects, such as nuclear plants and some
forms of sinks, limits the scope of the CDM approval mechanism, but it does not
jeopardize its proper operation within its area of competence.
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The CDM Executive Board is woven into a web of internal accountability
mechanisms. Together, these mechanisms shall ensure that approval decisions
are made in accordance with the decision criteria provided by the CoP and help
protect decisions from distortion by partisan interests of states and non-state
actors. Composition of the Board and relevant decision rules create a consensus-
based situation of committee governance and preclude one camp from outvoting
the other. The approval procedures divide decision functions among a number
of involved actors. The Executive Board is formally in charge, but applicants
elaborate methodologies and submit project proposals, the Methodologies Panel
evaluates the assessment methodologies, and operational entities recruited from
outside validate projects based upon a recognized methodology and verify them
before emission credits are released. Still missing from this multifaceted account-
ability arrangement is a layer that protects the rights and interests of public and
private investors in CDM projects. If well-designed, the currently emerging com-
plaint procedure can reinforce the internal accountability of the Board. For this
purpose, the reviewing body must itself be a trustee that is effectively shielded
from case-specific interference by the principals or other stakeholders.
External accountability plays a minor role. While accountability of the Board to
its principals remains as latent as it should be, external accountability to the
broader public has become a significant component of the assessment process.
The procedures provide several points of entry for comments from the public
that help attract relevant but dispersed knowledge. This form of external account-
ability has little to do with transnational democracy, or with ‘‘civil society’s’’
alleged participation rights. It is almost exclusively directed at improving the qual-
ity, and acceptability, of the adopted decisions. Participation is in fact very selec-
tive. In every single case, only a handful of experts from NGOs, competent
institutes, and possibly also from state bureaucracies or competing firms, will dis-
pose of the knowledge and skills necessary to prepare a convincing intervention.
Altogether, this procedure promises to facilitate impartial judgment of submis-
sions in light of the valid decision criteria, and to discourage partisan interven-
tion, unless it is based upon convincing arguments. Yet, the analysis of critical
cases points to some obstacles to generating well-reasoned, and therefore accept-
able, decisions. The Graneros case illustrates how a submission is, in the pres-
ence of uncertainty, only gradually adjusted over time. The V&M do Brasil case
draws attention to the interpretability of the additionality criterion. The lasting
conflict between two camps of experts over ‘‘avoided fuel switch projects’’ was
only overcome by sidestepping issues of principle and by resorting to a case-spe-
cific decision. The HFC 23 case demonstrates the limits of the technocratic deci-
sion-making rationale in cases of an alleged necessity to apply additional criteria.
The eventually identified interim solution reflects the fact that the approval sys-
tem cannot, and should not, invent its own criteria, because this would inevitably
undermine the vertical division of labor between the trustee and her principals.
The CDM approval apparatus demonstrates that delegation of decision-making
authority to administrative trustee agents promises to enhance the governance
capacity of international institutions and the quality of the decisions produced.
The two main prerequisites for successful trusteeship governance are fulfilled.
First, there is a carefully delimited division of labor between principals and trus-
tee agent which is adhered to by both sides. Second, the trustee invested with
decision-making authority is effectively held accountable for her decisions and
cannot easily ignore the existing decision criteria. Hence, the CDM arrangement
provides a model for nonpartisan international regulation in the presence of the
demand for continuous decision making in light of general decision criteria and
serious credible commitment problems that encourage the member states of an
international institution to delegate regulation to a comparatively autonomous
trustee agent.
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